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THE SURVIVORS' 25-YEAR PRESUMPTION
UNDER THE BLACK LUNG BENEFITS
REFORM ACT OF 1977: A CASE FOR ITS
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
DAVID J. MILLSTONE*
MARIA J. CODINACH**

Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
19691 [the Black Lung Act], as amended by the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 19772 establishes, inter alia, a new presumption intended to substantially assist widows and other dependent
survivors of coal miners in gaining benefits for disability caused
by coal workers' pneumoconiosis (more commonly known as black
lung disease). Survivors of coal miners who died before March 1,
1978, with twenty-five or more years of coal mine employment
accrued prior to July 1, 1971, are presumed to be entitled to benefits unless it is established that, at the time of his death, the
miner was neither totally nor even partially disabled by the
3
disease.
* A.B., The Johns Hopkins University, 1968; J.D., West Virginia University,
1971; Partner, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, Ohio. Member, West Virginia Bar, Ohio Bar, Florida Bar.
** A.B., Loretto Heights College, 1966; M.A., University of Texas, 1969; J.D.,
Ohio State University, 1976. Associate, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland,
Ohio. Member, Ohio Bar.
' Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, §8
401-426, 83 Stat. 852 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-936 (1969)). [hereinafter cited
as "the Black Lung Act" or "the BLA"].
S Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 105
(codified at 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-941 (West Supp. 1979)). [hereinafter cited as "1977
Act" or "1977 Amendments"].
3 Section 3(a)(3) of the 1977 Act amends § 411(c) of the Black Lung Act, 30
U.S.C.A. § 921(c) (West Supp. 1979), by adding the following provision:
(5) In the case of a miner who dies on or before March 1, 1978, who
was employed for 25 years or more in one or more coal mines before
June 30, 1971, the eligible survivors of such miner shall be entitled to
the payment of benefits, at the rate applicable under section 922(a)(2) of
this title, unless it is established that at the time of his or her death
such miner was not partially or totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis.
Eligible survivors shall, upon request by the Secretary, furnish such evi-
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The purpose of this article is to discuss the twenty-five year
presumption and some of the constitutional issues which it poses.
To put these considerations in perspective, this article will set out
a brief overview of the provisions of the Black Lung Act and its
various amendments, a brief review of the presumption's legislative history and its operation and, finally, a discussion of some
constitutional infirmities of the new presumption.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE BLACK LUNG ACT AND ITS AMENDMENTS

The Black Lung Act was enacted in 1969 to provide benefits
for miners who were totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of employment in coal mines and for the survivors of miners whose deaths were due to this disease. 4 At that time, few
states were providing benefits for death or disabilities caused by
the disease. In response, the federal government set up a temporary program to provide for such benefits. This program was intended to be phased out as the states, in cooperation with the
federal government, adopted new laws for the benefit of miners.
Title IV was essentially enacted as a one-shot effort to provide
what was then characterized as "emergency
benefits" for a spe5
cific group of miners and their survivors.
As originally enacted, the Black Lung Act created three presumptions for the purpose of aiding miners and their survivors in
establishing their claim: First, if a miner who is suffering or had
suffered from pneumoconiosis had been employed for ten years
or more in one or more underground coal mines, there is a rebuttable presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose out of such employment. Second, if a deceased miner had been employed for ten
dence as is available with respect to the health of the miner at the time
of his or her death.
4 BLA § 401, 30 U.S.C. § 901 (1969).
See generally, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COAL MINE HEALTH
AND SAFm ACT OF 1969, as amended through 1974 including Black Lung Amendments of 1972 Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong. (1975)
[hereinafter cited as "LEGISLATwE HISTORY"], at 348-50; 398-407; 414-50; 503-05;
511-34; 770-72; 904-10; 951-57; 1042-44; 1068-70; 1153-55; 1168; 1191-93; 1112-15;
1120; 1129-33; 1256-57; 1267-79; 1292-94; 1381; 1411-12; 1494-1500; 1532-35; 1542-

51; 1556-61; 1564-65; 1598; and 1629-34.
o Pneumoconiosis was originally defined as a "chronic dust disease of the lung
arising out of employment in an underground coal mine." BLA § 402(b), 30 U.S.C.
§ 902(b) (1969).
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years or more in one or more underground coal mines and died
from a respirable disease, there is a rebuttable presumption that
his death was due to pneumoconiosis. Third, if a miner is suffering or has suffered from a chronic dust disease of the lung which
can be diagnosed as complicated pneumoconiosis or progressive
massive fibrosis, there is an irrebuttable presumption that he is
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis or that his death was due
to pneumoconiosis. 7 These presumptions were applicable both to
the claims which were to be paid by the federal government (Part
B claims)8 and the claims which were to be paid by individual
coal mine operators (Part C claims)9 .

7 BLA § 411(c)(1)-(3), 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(l)-(3) (1969). "Total disability" was
defined in the 1969 Act as having "the m.,aning given it by regulations of the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, but such regulations shall not provide more restrictive criteria than those applicable under Section 423(d) of Title
42." BLA § 402(f), 30 U.S.C. § 902(f) (1976). The regulations defining total disability appeared at 20 C.F.R. 410, Subpart D (1970).
8 Under Part B of the original Black Lung Act, the federal government assumed responsibility for all claims filed on or before December 31, 1972, or, in the
case of a widow-claimant, six months after the miner's death or December 31,
1972, whichever was later. BLA § 414(a), 30 U.S.C. § 924(a) (1969). Benefits for
Part B claims filed before December 31, 1971, began on the date the claim was
filed, and the federal government was liable for such payments as long as the
miner or his survivor was entitled to receive benefits under the criteria established
by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, who was given authority to
administer Part B of the BLA. BLA § 414(b), 30 U.S.C. § 924(b) (1969). Thereafter, such benefits were to be paid by the responsible coal mine operator. BLA §
422, 30 U.S.C. § 932 (1969).
* Under Part C of the original Black Lung Act, claims for benefits for death
or total disability due to pneumoconiosis fied after January 1, 1973, had to be
filed pursuant to the applicable state workers' compensation law, i.e., workers'
compensation laws included in a list published by the Secretary of Labor, who was
given the authority to administer Part C of the BLA. BLA § 421(a), 30 U.S.C. §
931(a) (1969). For those periods in which a state workers' compensation law was
not included in the Secretary's list, coal mine operators were responsible for the
payment of benefits to claimants who filed their claims after January 1, 1973. BLA
§ 422, 30 U.S.C. § 932 (1969). Claims for benefits under Part C had a three-year
statute of limitations, beginning on the date of the discovery of total disability due
to pneumoconiosis or date of death due to pneumoconiosis. BLA § 422(f), 30
U.S.C. § 932(f) (1969). No benefits were payable under this section for any period
prior to January 1, 1973, or for any period after seven years after December 30,
1969. BLA § 422(e), 30 U.S.C. § 932(e) (1969). In those cases in which there was
no responsible coal mine operator to secure the payment of such benefits, the federal government assumed liability for Part C claims. BLA § 424, 30 U.S.C. § 934
(1969). The presumptions were applicable to transition period and Part C adjudi-
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Given the fact that by 1972 no state had satisfactorily modified its workers' compensation laws to meet the requirements imposed by Part C of the Black Lung Act10 and that the administration of that Act had proved incapable of servicing the goals which
the Act had sought to achieve, 1 Congress enacted the Black Lung
Benefits Act of 1972.12 The 1972 Act, inter alia, added a new presumption applicable to both Part B and C claims. If a miner was
employed for fifteen years or more in one or more underground
coal mines,13 and if there was a chest x-ray submitted in connection with a claim which was interpreted as negative for complicated pneumoconiosis, 1' and if other evidence demonstrated the
existence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, there was a rebuttable presumption that such miner was
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, that his death was due to
pneumoconiosis, or that at the time of his death he was totally
disabled due to pneumoconiosis. 15 The 1972 Act specifically pro-

cation by the Secretary of Labor by the operation of BLA §§ 422(h), 411(b), 30
U.S.C. §§ 932(h), 921(b) (1969).
10See generally, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5.
11 Id.

Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (codified
at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-941 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as "the 1972 Act" or "the 1972
Amendments"].
's The use of this presumption in Part C adjudications was limited by a proviso that for purposes of determining the applicability of § 411(c)(4) to Part C
claims, no period of employment after June 30, 1971, shall be considered to determine whether a miner was employed at least 15 years in coal mines. BLA § 430, 30
U.S.C. § 940 (1976).
" See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3) (1976).
15 BLA § 411(c)(4), 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4) (1976). This presumption was limited by a proviso that in the case of a living miner, a wife's affidavit cannot be
used by itself to establish the presumption. This presumption can only be rebutted by the Secretary by establishing that the miner does not or did not have pneumoconiosis or that his respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise out of,
or in connection with, employment in a coal mine. The definition of pneumoconiosis was amended by the 1972 Act to read as follows: "a chronic dust disease of the
lung arising out of employment in a coal mine." BLA § 402(b), 30 U.S.C. § 902(b)
(1976). The definition of total disability was also amended to provide that under
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's regulations, a miner "shall be
considered totally disabled when pneumoconiosis prevents him from engaging in
gainful employment requiring the skills and abilities comparable to those of any
employment in a mine or mines in which he previously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of time." BLA § 402(f), 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)
(1976).
'2
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vided that none of the rebuttable presumptions contained in section 8411 may be defeated solely on the basis of a negative chest xray.'

Another significant feature of the 1972 Act was the extension
of benefits to the survivors of miners who were totally disabled by
pneumoconiosis at the time of their death and to additional categories of dependent survivors. 17 Although Congress intended to
allow a "reasonable and necessary additional period" for the
states to prepare to assume responsibility for the payment of
black lung benefits, 8 the nature of the 1972 Amendments quite
clearly indicated that the black lung program was no longer a
temporary measure to provide emergency benefits but a permanent program.
By 1977, it became obvious to Congress that the states were
not moving ahead with the desired black lung legislation and that
administrative difficulties were continuing to plague both the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Department
of Labor.' 9 Congress then amended the Black Lung Act for the
second time with the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 197720
§§ 413(b), 430, 30 U.S.C. §§ 923(b), 940 (1976).
BLA §§ 402(a), 402(e), 402(g), 411, 412, 30 U.S.C. §§ 902(a), 902(e), 902(g),
921, 922 (1976).
18 See, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 1731-32.
The 1972 Act also extended the deadline for shifting liability to the states or
responsible coal mine operators. Under the 1972 Amendments, the federal government's liability was extended to claims filed on or before December 31, 1973. For
claims filed on or before June 30, 1973, the federal government assumed lifetime
liability. BLA § 413, 30 U.S.C. § 923 (1976). As to claims filed after June 30, 1973,
but prior to January 1, 1974, the federal government assumed total liability until
December 31, 1973. Id. Thereafter, liability for Part B claims was shifted to the
states or coal mine operators. BLA §§ 415(a), 422(e), 30 U.S.C. §§ 925, 932(e)
(1976). Liability for Part C claims began on January 1, 1974. BLA § 422, 30 U.S.C.
§ 932 (1976). Benefits under this part were payable until December 30, 1981.
Is BLA
17

19 See generally, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE BLACK LUNG REVENUE ACT OF

1977, S. REP. No. 95-336, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977) reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE BLACK LUNG BENEFITS REFORM ACT OF 1977 and THE BLACK LUNG
REVENUE ACr OF 1977 [hereinafter cited as "LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1977
AMENDMENTS"]; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE BLACK LUNG BENEFITS REFORM ACT
OF 1977, H.R. REP. No. 95-151, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977) and S. REP. No. 95-336,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977) reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1977 AMENDMENTS, supra.
20 Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 105 (codified at 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-941 (West

Supp. 1979)).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1980

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 4 [1980], Art. 42

1084

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

and the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 197721, primarily to
revise the criteria for determining eligibility for black lung claims,
to transfer from the federal government to the coal industry the
residual liability for black lung benefits, and to establish a Black
Lung Disability Insurance
Fund funded by tonnage payments
22
from the coal industry.
Among the significant changes of the 1977 Amendments were
the definitions of "miner,"2 3 "pneumoconiosis," 24 and "total disability"; 25 the introduction of more liberal criteria and presump-

" Pub. L. No. 95-227, 92 Stat. 11 (codified at 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 934-934(a)
(West Supp. 1979)).
22 Because there was opposition to a permanent federal program, Congress
decided to shift the residual liability for black lung benefits to the private industry. See H.R. REP. No. 95-151, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 21-22 (1977), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1977 AmFaPmNrS, supra note 19; S. REP. No. 95209, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 6,7 (1977), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
1977 AmFDmES, supra note 19; Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee on
Taxation and Debt Management Generally, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 33-35 (1977);
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Human Resources, United States Senate, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 221-51 (1977); House Debate
on H.R. 4544, 123 CONG. REc. at H9614 (daily ed. September 19, 1977), reprinted
in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1977 AmENDmENTS, supra note 19, at 804.
In order to shift black lung liability to the private sector, the Black Lung
Benefits Revenue Act of 1977 created a Trust Fund for benefit payments to be
financed by a tax based upon the tonnage of coal mined by coal mine operators.
See 30 U.S.C.A. § 934(a) (West Supp. 1979). The Trust Fund, inter alia, pays
benefits in cases in which there is no operator who is required to secure the payment of such benefits or where a liable operator has failed to make payment in a
timely manner or cases in which the miner's last coal mine employment was
before January 1, 1970. 30 U.S.C.A. § 934 (West Supp. 1979). As long as an employer can be identified, however, said employer is individually liable for payments under the 1977 Act. 30 U.S.CA. § 932 (West Supp. 1979).
S Miner is now defined, as follows:
any individual who works or has worked in or around a coal mine or coal
preparation facility in the extraction or preparation of coal. Such term
also includes an individual who works or has worked in coal mine construction or transportation in or around a coal mine, to the extent such
individual was exposed to coal dust as a result of such employment.
1977 Act § 2(b), 30 U.S.C.A. § 902(d) (West Supp. 1979).
24 The definition of pneumoconiosis is now, as follows: "a chronic dust disease
of the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments,
arising out of coal mine employment." 1977 Act § 2(a), 30 U.S.C.A. § 902(b) (West
Supp. 1979).
' Total disability is now defined as having the meaning given it by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's regulations for Part B claims and by
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tions to determine eligibility for benefits; 6 and a mandatory review using the 1977 Act criteria of all Part B and Part C claims
that had either been previously denied or were currently pending.27 One of the most controversial features of the 1977 Act was
the introduction of the new twenty-five year survivors' presumption,2" the subject matter of this article.
regulations of the Secretary of Labor for claims under Part C, subject to other
provisions of the Act, except that:
(A) in the case of a living miner, such regulations shall provide
that a miner shall be considered totally disabled when pneumoconiosis
prevents him or her from engaging in gainful employment requiring the
skills and abilities comparable to those of any employment in a mine or
mines in which he or she previously engaged with some regularity and
over a substantial period of time;
(B) such regulations shall provide that (i) a deceased miner's employment in a mine at the time of death shall not be used as conclusive
evidence that the miner was not totally disabled; and (ii) in the case of a
living miner, if there are changed circumstances of employment indicative of reduced ability to perform his or her usual coal mine work, such
miner's employment in a mine shall not be used as conclusive evidence
that the miner is not totally disabled;
(C) such regulations shall not provide more restrictive criteria
than those applicable under section 223(d) of the Social Security Act.
1977 Act § 2(c), 30 U.S.C.A. § 902(f)(1)(West Supp. 1979).
The criteria applied by the Secretary of Labor in the case of
(A) any claim which is subject to review by the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare, or subject to a determination by the
Secretary of Labor, under Section 435(a);
(B) any claim which is subject to review by the Secretary of Labor
under section 435(b); and
(C) any claim filed on or before the effective date of regulations
promulgated under this subsection by the Secretary of Labor;
shall not be more restrictive than the criteria applicable to a claim filed
on June 30, 1973, whether or not the final disposition of any such claim
occurs after the date of such promulgation of regulations by the Secretary of Labor.
1977 Act § 2(c), 30 U.S.C-A. § 902(f)(2) (West Supp. 1979).
26 See 1977 Act §§ 3(a), 5, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 921(c), 925 (West Supp. 1979).
2

1977 Act § 15, 30 U.S.C.A. § 945 (West Supp. 1979).

- 1977 Act § 3(a), 30 U.S.CA.. § 921(c)(5) (West Supp. 1979) [hereinafter
cited as "twenty-five year presumption"].
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIVE YEAR
PRESUMPTION

The original House bil 29 to amend the Black Lung Act contained a provision entitling a miner or his eligible survivor to the
payment of benefits after the miner had been employed for thirty
years or more in underground coal mines, or after a miner had
been employed for twenty-five years or more in anthracite coal
mines.30 No medical evidence of disability or illness was required
in order to qualify for this benefit. The federal government would
pay the benefits if the last date of employment preceded December 30, 1969, and responsible coal mine operators would pay benefits for miners whose thirty years of employment were obtained
by June 30, 1971.31
The original Senate bill 32 established an entitlement to benefits for survivors of miners who worked in the mines for twentyfive years or more prior to June 30, 1971, and who died on or
before the date of enactment of the 1977 Amendments, unless it
is established that the miner was not partially or totally disabled
due to pneumoconiosis when he died.3 s Upon request by the Secretary of Labor, survivors were to provide available evidence re-

,9 H.R. 4544, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. (1977), reprinted in LEGISLATV HISTORY
OF THE 1977 AmNMENTS, supra note 19, at 463.
30 Id. § 2(a). Predecessor bills in Congress had also contained similar pre-

sumptions. H.R. 17178, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), contained a 25 years-of-employment rebuttable presumption of total disability or death due to pneumoconiosis which could only be rebutted by a negative result of a blood-gas study. If a
miner was employed for 35 years or more, there was an irrebutable presumption of
total disability or death due to pneumoconiosis. The same presumption appeared
in H.R. 7, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) and H.R. 8, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
H.R. 2913, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), contained a 15 years-of-employment irrebuttable presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis. H.R. 10760,
94th Cong., 1st Seas. (1975), contained the same presumptions as H.R. 4544. S.
3183, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), contained an irrebuttable presumption that
black lung disability exists if a miner worked underground in a bituminous or
anthracite mine for 25 years. H.R. 1532, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), contained
the same presumption. H.R. 4389, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), provided that if a
miner was employed for 20 years or more, there was an irrebuttable presumption
of total disability or death due to pneumoconiosis.
31 H.R. REP. No. 95-151, supra note 22, at 516-17.
' S. 1538, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. (1977), reprinted in LEGISLATriE HISTORY OF
THE 1977 AmENDM Ems, supra note 19, at 636.
S. REP. No. 95-209, supra note 22, at 640.
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specting the miner's health at the time of his death.3 4
Benefits with respect to claims in which the miner's last coal
mine employment was before January 1, 1970, were to be paid by
a Trust Fund created by the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of
1977. ' 5 Benefits for the survivors of those employed after that
date would be paid by the responsible operators, or, if no responsible operator could be found, by the Trust Fund.38
Although the medical evidence presented to Congress did not
demonstrate conclusively that there was a causal relationship between duration of employment and the incidence of total disability due to pneumoconiosis 37 the House and Senate Committee
which reported on the proposed amendments linked years of employment to the entitlement of benefits as a matter of social policy.3 8 As the Senate Committee on Human Resources stated:
Widows have perhaps been even more adversely and
wrongfully affected by black lung claim denials than living
miners, for in all too many instances the probative value of the
widow's evidence submitted in support of a claim is not good.
It is not her fault. Medical records may have been lost or destroyed. The miner may have been lost forever in an underground mine explosion. He may have died so long ago that
clinical knowledge of the day did not include pneumoconiosis
- the cause of death was simplistically attributed to 'heart
failure.' For these and other reasons the Committee believes
that concern for the welfare of these widows, whose husbands
gave their physical strength, their bodies and their lives to this
most difficult occupation, should override any professed need
to demonstrate a clinically precise association between years
4Id.

U.S.C.A. §§ 934-934(a)(West Supp. 1979). See also S. REP. No. 95-209,
supra note 22, at 650-51.
8 S. Rep. No. 95-209, supra note 22, at 646-49.
7At
hearings conducted in 1973, 1974 and 1975, the House Committee on
Education and Labor heard extensive reports on the relationship between years of
coal mine employment and the prevalence and severity of pneumoconiosis. The
Committee summarized its conclusions based upon the evidence presented at the
hearings in H.R. REP. No. 94-770, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), to accompany H.R.
10760, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The twenty-five year presumption as it appeared in H.R. 10760 was debated at length in the House on March 6, 1976. See
LEGISLATrVE HISTORY OF THE 1977 AmENDmENTs, supra note 19, at 210.
3530

SH.R. REP. No. 95-151, supra note 22, at 512-16; S. REP. No. 95-209, supra
note 22, at 620-21.
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worked and totally disabling lung disease. This provision, and
others contained in the bill, give the benefit of any doubt to
the miner's widow. Any burden is on the Secretary9 to show
that the miner was not partially or totally disabled
The conference substitute bill, which became law, adopted
40
year presumption.
the Senate provision for a twenty-five
III.

OPERATION OF THE PRESUMPTION

The basic requirements for eligibility for benefits under Section 411(c)(5) are: (1) that the miner died on or before March 1,
1978; (2) that the miner was employed twenty-five years or more
in one or more coal mines before June 30, 1971; and (3) that the
claimant is an eligible survivor of the miner. If a claimant establishes these facts, his or her eligibility can only be defeated by
establishing that the miner at the time of his or her death was
neither partially nor totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. Survivors who establish eligibility under this presumption are entitled to benefits on a retroactive basis for a period beginning no
earlier than January 1, 1974.41
The term partial disability, as used in the twenty-five year
presumption, is not defined in the 1977 Act. The legislative his-

tory of the Act is also silent as to the exact meaning of this term.
The Secretary of Labor's interim regulations define partial disaor her usual
bility as a miner's "reduced ability to engage in 14his
2

coal mine work or comparable and gainful work.

Since the Act

39 S. REP. No. 95-209, supra note 22, at 621.
H.R. REP. No. 95-864, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1977 AMENDMErrs, supra note 19, at 872.
the 1977
41 BLA § 435(c), 30 U.S.CAL § 945(c) (West Supp. 1979). Under
7(d), 30
§
Act
1977
benefits.
Amendments, widows are entitled to lifetime
limitations
the
to
subject
are
survivors
Other
1979).
Supp.
(West
U.S.C.A. § 932(e)
of BLA § 402(a) and (g), 30 U.S.C.A. § 902(a) and (g) and regulations thereunder.
43 20 C.F.R. § 727.204(b)(1979). Comparable and gainful work for purposes of
requirthe Act is defined as "gainful work in the immediate area of his residence
in
mines
or
mine
a
in
work
any
of
those
to
comparable
abilities
and
skills
ing the
regularity and over a substantial period of
which he previously engaged with some
79
time." 20 C.F.R. § 410.412(a)(1)(19 ).
Under the new permanent regulations, applicable to all claims filed after
March 31, 1980, partial disability is defined as "reduced ability to engage in work"
which is the miner's "usual coal mine work" or "gainful employment in the immecomdiate area of his or her [the miner's] residence requiring the skill or abilities
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defines total disability to mean the inability to engage in the
miner's regular coal work or comparable and gainful work, the
Secretary, in the comments to the regulation on partial disability,
adds that "partial disability must mean something less than total
disability for the same type of work. '4 3 Accordingly, the Department of Labor's regulations establish that in order to rebut this
presumption the evidence must demonstrate that the miner's
ability to perform his or her usual and customary work or comparable and gainful work was not reduced at the time of his or her
death or that the miner did not have pneumoconiosis. 44 The Department of Labor's regulations further provide that the following
alone shall not be sufficient to rebut the twenty-five year presumption: evidence that a deceased miner was employed in a coal
mine at the time of death; evidence pertaining to a deceased
miner's level of earnings prior to death; a chest x-ray interpreted
as a negative for the existence of pneunoconiosis; a death certificate which makes no mention of pneumoconiosis.'0
Given the vague definition of the term partial disability in
the regulations, it is expected that a significant number of claims
under the twenty-five year presumption will be contested and
that the Benefit Review Board's (the "Board") decisions will refine its exact meaning. Four cases discussed below give some indication of the Department of Labor's hearing officer's application
of the presumption.
In Marinelli v. North American Coal Corp.,46 evidence of a
cough in 1968, increased bronchial markings in x-rays taken in
1970, and the reluctance of the particular miner to complain were
held to have established that a miner who was diagnosed as having cancer of the right lung in March of 1974 was "partially disabled" due to pneumoconiosis prior to the onset of cancer and at
the time df his death. The miner had performed his usual coal
mine work as a mechanic until the carcinoma was diagnosed. He
subsequently died of cancer of the right lung in March of 1975.

parable to those of any employment in a mine or mines in which he or she previously engaged with some regularity over a substantial period of time." 20 C.F.R.
§§ 718.204(b), 718.306(b)(1980).
43 20 C.F.R. § 727.204 (1979).
44 20 C.F.R. §§ 727.204(c), 718.306(c)(1979).
45 20 C.F.R. §§ 727.204(d), 718.306(d)(1979).
4' Case No. 76-BLA-971 (Decision dated February 28, 1979).
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The hearing officer held that the responsible coal mine operator
was liable for the payment7 of widow's benefits beginning on the
4
date of the miner's death.

Freeman v. Old Ben Coal Co.4 8 is another unreported decision construing the twenty-five year presumption and the regulations thereunder. Although the hearing officer in that case found
that the miner had never been disabled to an extent that would
hinder the performance of his most recent tasks at the mine, he
went on to note a lack of evidence which would establish that,
during these latter years, he was not disabled by pneumoconiosis
that would prevent him from engaging in work which was "comparable to the most arduous employment in which he engaged
with some regularity and over a substantial period of time during
his entire career as a coal miner.' ' Accordingly, he awarded benefits to the claimant and held that the responsible coal mine operator was liable for their payment.
In another opinion, Guadiano v. U.S. Steel Corp.,50 the
miner in question had been killed in a coal mine accident and
prior to the 1977 Act his widow had been denied black lung benefits under the criteria then in effect. On remand by the Board for
a determination under the 1977 Amendments, the administrative
law judge held that the widow qualified for benefits under the
47The Marinelli case was initially decided on April 22, 1977, 6 BRBS 1
(1977) (ALJ op.), by a hearing officer who denied the claim and held that the
miner's total disability and death were caused by lung cancer. On appeal to the
Board, the Board affirmed the hearing officer but, pursuant to the review provisions contained in § 15 of the 1977 Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 945 (West Supp. 1979),
remanded the case to be determined under the provisions of the 1977 Act, which
had become effective after the first hearing was held. 8 BRBS 1045 (1978). On
remand, the hearing officer denied the miner's claim, holding that the claimant
had failed to meet the requirements of the interim presumption contained in 20
C.F.R. § 410.490 (1979) because the miner was able to work until March of 1974,
but he nonetheless awarded benefits on the basis of the twenty-five year presumption. The hearing officer's 1979 Decision had been appealed to the Board, which
heard oral argument on October 17, 1979. BRB No. 79-259 BLA. The argument
before the Board included argument on constitutional issues raised by the responsible coal mine operator. On appeal the Marinelli case was consolidated with
Guadiano v. United States Steel Corp., BRB No. 79-435 BLA and Freeman v. Old
Ben Coal Co., BRB No. 79-114 BLA, also discussed in this section.
48 BRB No. 79-114 BLA.
4' Id.
10 BRB No. 79-435 BLA.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol82/iss4/42

12

Millstone
The Survivors' 25-Year
Presumption under the Black
SURVIVORS'
1980] and Codnach:
PRESUMPTION
1091 Lung Benefits
twenty-five year presumption because the miner's autopsy
showed that he had simple pneumoconiosis and because his foreman had testified that the miner had some physical difficulties at
work when required to walk long distances and that his breathing
sounded abnormal. He rejected the employer's contention that,
since there was no physical limitation on his ability to work at the
time of his death, the miner was not partially disabled within the
meaning of the Act.
However, in the most recent unreported decision, Jackson v.
North American Coal Corp.,51 the hearing officer held that a coal
miner who died of cardiac arrest due to a myocardial infarction
and who was employed at the time of his death performing the
same work he had been doing for at least seven years at the same
earnings level was not partially disabled due to pneumoconiosis.
It appears from these decisions that there is no consensus as
to the meaning of partial disability for purposes of the twentyfive year presumption and that, at least at the hearing level, the
slightest evidence of a physical discomfort will establish in most
cases that a miner was partially disabled. Considering that the
responsible coal mine operator must then prove the negative (i.e.
that the miner was not partially disabled), it is not unreasonable
to postulate that the twenty-five year presumption has become an
irrebuttable one for all practical purposes.
IV.

CONSnTUTIONAL ISSUES

A.

Rationality

Presumptions arising in civil statutes involving economic legislation such as the Black Lung Act are tested for their constitutionality against the rational connection standard articulated by
the United States Supreme Court in Mobile Jackson & K. C.
52
Railroad v. Turnipseed:
51 Case No. 80-BLA-210 (Decision dated March 28, 1980). This decision has
also been appealed to the Board by the claimant with a cross appeal by the

operator.
52 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910). In Mobile, a state statute provided that in tort actions against railroad companies for damages to persons or property, proof of injury inflicted by the running of the locomotives or cars of the company shall be
prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the company. The statute was
construed by the Supreme Court of Mississippi as to create a presumption of lia-
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That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence
of another may not constitute a denial of due process of law or
a denial of the equal protection of the law it is only essential
that there shall be some rational connection between the fact
proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference
of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable
as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. So, also, it must not,
under guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate
to preclude the party from the right to present his defense to
the main fact thus presumed.
If a legislative provision not unreasonable in itself prescribing a rule of evidence, in either criminal or civil cases,
does not shut out from the party affected a reasonable opportunity to submit to the jury in his defense all of the facts bearing upon the issue, there is no ground for holding that due
process of law has been denied him."

The constitutionality of the presumptions contained in subsections 411(c)(1) and (2) of the Black Lung Act was challenged
by coal mine operators in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.55
on the ground that a presumption based on duration of employment, without reference to degrees of exposure to coal dust, was

irrational and arbitrary and, thus, did not meet the Mobile standards. Using the standards set out in Mobile and United States

bility. Tested against the standard set forth infra, the United States Supreme
Court found that such presumption did not deny the defendant the equal protection of the law or otherwise fail in due process of law on the grounds that it was
fair to infer negligence from damages caused by a moving car and that the operation of the presumption was "only to supply an inference of liability in the absence of other evidence contradicting such inference." 219 U.S. at 43.
Id. at 43. See also Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 28
(1976). The same test has been used by the United States Supreme Court to test
the constitutionality of presumptions contained in criminal statutes. See Leary v.
United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 67 (1965);
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 466 (1943).
30 U.S.C.A. § 921(c)(1)-(2)(West Supp. 1979). This section provides:
(c) For purposes of this section (1) If a miner who is suffering or suffered from pneumoconiosis
was employed for ten years or more in one or more coal mines there
shall be a rebuttable presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose out of
such employment.
(2) If a deceased miner was employed for ten years or more in one
or more coal mines and died from a respirable disease there shall be a
rebuttable presumption that his death was due to pneumoconiosis.
" 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
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v. Gainey,5s the Court found that both presumptions were valid.
The Court reasoned that since all a presumption does is to shift
the burden of going forward from the claimant to the operator
and that since there was medical evidence before Congress indicating the noticeable incidence of pneumoconiosis in cases of miners with ten years' employment in the mines, it could not be said
that Congress acted arbitrarily in selecting a ten-year figure as a
point of reference to determine the cause of the disabling disease.57 This holding was based on the fact that the ten years of
employment would not by itself activate the presumption of
pneumoconiosis, but rather that the prerequisite length of employment plus medical evidence of pneumoconiosis would establish the cause of it. The Court's position was summarized as
follows:
It is worth repeating that mine employment for 10 years does
not serve by itself to activate any presumption of pneumoconiosis; it simply serves along with proof of pneumoconiosis

under § 411(c)(1) to presumptively establish the cause of
58 380

U.S. 63 (1965). In Gainey, respondent had been convicted, inter alia,

of carrying on the business of a distiller without bond in violation of 26 U.S.C. §
5601(a)(4) on the basis of a presumption which authorized a jury to infer guilt of
the substantive offenses from the fact of a defendant's unexplained presence at
the site of an illegal still. See 26 U.S.C. § 5601(b)(2)(1976). The United States
Supreme Court held that the statutory presumption of 26 U.S.C. § 5601(b)(2) is
constitutionally permissible since there is a reasonable connection between a defendant's unexplained presence at a still and the comprehensive crime of the illegal distilling operation. The Court stated:
The process of making the determination of rationality is, by its nature,
highly empirical, and in matters not within specialized judicial competence or completely commonplace, significant weight should be accorded
the capacity of Congress to amass the stuff of actual experience and cull
conclusions from it. As the record in the Circuits shows, courts have differed in assessing the weight to be placed upon the fact of the defendant's unexplained presence at a still. 380 U.S. at 67.
Prior to enactment of the statute, the various federal courts of appeals were
divided as to whether juries should be instructed that a defendant's presence at a
still could be considered by them as determining whether the defendant had participated in carrying on the illegal operation, but the majority allowed such instruction. The statutory presumptions were enacted to solve the lack of uniformity in the applicable instructions. The Court emphasized the fact that "it is
precisely when courts have been unable to agree as to the exact relevance of a
frequently occurring fact in an atmosphere pregnant with illegality that Congress'
resolution is appropriate." 380 U.S. at 67.
57 428 U.S. at 29.
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pneumoconiosis, and along with proof of death from a respiratory disease under § 411(c)(2) to presumptively establish that
death was due to pneumoconiosis.5 8

Although, for the purpose of shifting the burden of proof,

years of employment was used to the exclusion of other relevant
factors such as the degree of dust exposure, the Court refused to

hold that Congress had acted arbitrarily in giving more weight to
that particular contributing factor. Given the number of factors
contributing to pneumoconiosis and the impossibility of measuring the exact impact of each one, the Court concluded that it was
just a matter of "rough accommodations" for Congress to determine that a particular and significant variable would signal the
point at which the coal mine operator must come forward with
the cause of the disease or death.59
The coal mine operators in Turner also challenged the con-

stitutionality of the presumptions contained in section 411(c)(4)
of the Black Lung Act,60 which provides that a miner who is employed for fifteen years in underground mines and offers proof of
a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment shall be

Id. (emphasis added).
" Id. at 29-30.
do 30 U.S.C.A. § 921(c)(4) (West Supp. 1979). This section provides:
(c) For purposes of this section(4) If a miner was employed for fifteen years or more in one or
more underground coal mines, and if there is a chest roentgenogram
submitted in connection with such miner's, his widow's, his child's, his
parent's, his brother's, his sister's, or his dependent's claim under this
subchapter and it is interpreted as negative with respect to the requirements of paragraph (3) of this subsection, and if other evidence demonstrates the existence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, then there shall be a rebuttable presumption that such miner
is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, that his death was due to
pneumoconiosis, or that at the time of his death he was totally disabled
by pneumoconiosis. In the case of a living miner, a wife's affidavit may
not be used by itself to establish the presumption. The Secretary shall
not apply all or a portion of the requirement of this paragraph that the
miner work in an underground mine where he determines that conditions of a miner's employment in a coal mine other than an underground
mine were substantially similar to conditions in an underground mine.
The Secretary may rebut such presumption only by establishing that
(A) such miner does not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis, or that (B)
his respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise out of, or in connection with, employment in a coal mine.
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rebuttably presumed to be totally disabled by pneumoconiosis.
Applying the Mobile and Gainey standards to test the constitutionality of this presumption, the Court found that in light of the
testimony before Congress indicating that the fifteen year point
marks the beginning of the linear increase in the prevalence of
the disease with years spent underground, the durational basis of
this presumption was also unassailable.' As is the case in sections
411(c)(1) and (2),2 the presumption of section 411(c)(4) is triggered by proof of years of employment accompanied by medical
8
evidence of a disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment.
Tested against the principles enumerated in Turner, the constitutionality of the section 411(c)(5) twenty-five year presumption is at best questionable. The legislative history of the 1977
Act shows that Congress did not have clear medical evidence in
support of the proposition that there is a reasonable relationship
between years of employment and the incidence of partial or total
disability due to pneumoconiosis." In addition, the survivors entitled to the twenty-five year presumption are not required to
submit any medical evidence of a respiratory disease, thus failing
to meet the years of employment plus medical evidence test mandated by Turner.
The Senate report on the 1977 Amendments, which succinctly summarizes the evidence upon which Congress based its
enactment of the twenty-five year presumption for survivors and
rejected the proposal that the same presumption should apply to
living miners, essentially admits that Congress' enactment of the
presumption was based on social policy, not sound medical
evidence:
The House Committee on Education and Labor was per-

428 U.S. at 30-31.
30 U.S.C.A. § 921(c)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1979), supra note 53.
3 In Turner, the coal mine operators also challenged the constitutionality of
the irrebuttable presumption contained in Section 411(c)(3), 30 U.S.C.A. Section
921(c)(3) (West Supp. 1979). The Court's decision on this presumption is analyzed
infra.
" House Debate on H.R. 4544, 123 CONG. REc. H9610-32 (daily ed. September 19, 1977), reprinted in LEGISLATE HISTORY OF ThM 1977 AmENDMENTs, supra
note 19, at 804; Senate Debate on H.R 4544, 123 CONG. REG. S15193 (daily ed.
September 20, 1977), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1977 AMENDMEsNTS,
supra note 19, at 868.
'
'
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suaded that there is a link of causality between time employed
in the mines and the incidence of pneumoconiosis. The report
of the House Committee states that '80.89 percent of the
claims involving miners with a known coal mining employment
experience of 30 or more years have been allowed under part B
of the program', and that 'In recognition of the historically
demonstrated and exceedingly high probability of total disability... and out of concern for an equally probable risk of error
in the remaining cases, an objective test was established to
simply provide part B benefits payments to all claimants
whose claims have been denied and who could demonstrate 30
or more years of underground mining experience.' Dr. Murray
B. Hunter, director of the Fairmont Clinic in Fairmont, West
Virginia, testified that 'It is exposure over time that produces
coal workers' pneumoconiosis and the enactment of a reasonable presumption that thus and so many years of exposure to
coal mine dust ... represents sound social policy.
Although no extant medical study demonstrates conclusively the prevalence of pneumoconiosis and job-related respiratory and pulmonary impairments, and although the estimates
of such prevalence vary widely from study to study, it is interesting to note that partial data from the National Coal Workers' Autopsy Study conducted by the Appalachian Laboratory
for Occupationally Related Diseases (ALFORD) of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health indicate
that of 1,299 cases, coal workers' pneumoconiosis was mentioned in 1,175, or more than 90 percent of these. On the other
hand, other evidence available to the Committee indicates that
there is no clear causal relationship between duration of employment and the incidence of total disability due to
pneumoconiosis.
Nevertheless, it is clear to the Committee, just as it was in
1972, when those remedial amendments were enacted, that
many disabled miners' claims have been denied, partly because
the state of the medical art is not sufficiently advanced to unequivocally identify occupationally related disability in coal
miners. This problem is markedly exacerbated in the case of
deceased miners, particularly those who had the misfortune of
dying at a time when medical knowledge of coal workers'
pneumoconiosis was far scantier.
It is clear that complicated pneumoconiosis is a progressive and irreversible disease, and that the incidence of simple
pneumoconiosis, along with other serious respiratory impairments - which some believe also to be progressive - increases in relation to duration of coal mine employment. How-
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ever, these indicators are not so clear and compelling as to be

persuasive that miners be entitled to benefits solely on the basis of years of service without a showing of disability6

5

Extensive medical testimony before the House Education
and Labor Committee demonstrated that miners with clear x-rays
and with simple pneumoconiosis, some even with 35 or more
years of coal dust exposure, can still have normal ventilatory capacities and only a slight reduction of diffusing capacity (gas
transfer), a decrease of insufficient severity to constitute disability."6 Dr. Donald Rasmussen, from the Appalachian Regional
Hospital, testified in response to a direct question as to whether
the duration of exposure to coal dust has any relationship to a
miner's respiratory condition. He responded, "We see quite a variation. .

.

.We could show you some miners with.., fewer than

15 years who exhibit impairments in functions. We could show
you miners with 50 years or more and no impairment. I can't
7

really relate it to years of employment.M
Dr. N. LeRoy Lapp, from the West Virginia Medical Center,
who has been involved in numerous studies at ALFORD, also
stated:
[T]he preponderance of the medical evidence does not support
the presumption that because a man has worked for 25 years
or more in an underground coal mine that he should be necessarily totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis or that his death
should have occurred as a result of such pneumoconiosis un-

less the individual has radiographicevidence of the complicated form of the disease....

[T]he assumption that employment for 35 years or more
in an underground mine necessarily results in total disability
due to pneumoconiosis is not supported by the medical evi-

dence to date."

In addition, the National Academy of Sciences, in a 1976 report entitled "Coal Workers' Pneunoconiosis Medical Considerations, Some Social Implications," showed that although about
60% of the miners who had worked at least thirty years in anthracite coal mines had some stage of black lung, only 14.3% had
S. REP. No. 95-209, supra note 22, at 17-18.
H.R. RuP. No. 95-151, supra note 22.
67 Id. (emphasis added).
68Id. at 589 (emphasis added).
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progressive massive fibrosis, the disabling stage. 9 The number of
miners with the disease is even smaller in other than anthracite
mining regions. In the Appalachian region, 45% had the simplest
first stage, while only 2.1% were disabled. In the Midwest, only
25% had the disease after thirty years and no statistically significant number were disabled. In the West, 10% had the disease,
and no statistically significant number were disabled.70
Although it is true that the probability of developing pneumoconiosis increases with the number of years of coal mine employment, it is also true that the total percentage of miners contracting pneumoconiosis as the result of coal mine employment
remains very small.7 1 Curiously enough, after substantial testimony by eminent black lung medical specialists, the Committee
was "deeply impressed" by James L. Weeks, a lay consultant in
the area of pneumoconiosis, whose report is attached as an appendix to House Report 95-151.72 Mr. Weeks' report is essentially
based on public policy, not on medical evidence. Similarly, those
members of the medical profession who supported the entitlement provision of the 1977 Act did so on the basis of social policy
rather than on medical evidence.7 3
Interestingly, the presumption of disease based on length of
coal mine employment was even strongly opposed by the medical
profession as being detrimental to the miners in the long run. Dr.
Hans Weill, President of the American Thoracic Society, a branch
of the American Lung Association, testified:
We are here today speaking for the medical and scientific
communities in strongly suggesting that these entitlement provisions not be adopted. They would undermine the advances
and increasing sophistication of medical diagnosis and, in fact,
prejudge as ineffective the important dust control measures
61 Id. at 602.
70 Id. See also S. Rm. No. 95-209, supra note 22, at 17-18; House Debate on
H.R. 4544, 123 CONG. REC. at H7714-15 (daily ed. July 25, 1977), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1977 AmND Es,
supra note 19, at 753; House De-

bate on H.R. 4544, 123 CONG. REc. at H9615 (daily ed. September 19, 1977), reprinted in LEGISLATrE HISTORY OF 1977 AMENDMENTS, supra note 19, at 804.
71 See H.R. REP. No. 95-151, supra note 22, at Appendix.
72

Id.

See statements of Drs. Fine, Martin, Hunter and Desser in H.R. REP. No.
95-151, supra note 22.
7
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being undertaken in this and other industries which we hope
prevent occupational lung disease in the
will effectively
74
future.
Dr. Howard VanOrdstrand, the 1974 President of the American College of Chest Physicians and head of the environmental
health section of the Cleveland Clinic Foundation, also opposed
the entitlement provisions. He stated:
We do have medically established, clear-cut ways of determining both diagnosis as well as disability with reference to
coal workers' pneumoconiosis, as well as all of the other currently known fibrogenic dust diseases of the lungs.
I and our entire American College of Chest Physicians
strongly feel, therefore, that it continues to be sound medical
judgment that the determination of both coal workers' pneumoconiosis, as well as other pneumoconiosis, be made through
completely well-established ways of diagnosis and disability irregardless [sic] of the number of years of working at the dust
rather than just empirically on
hazards [sic] such as in mining,
75
the basis of years of mining.
He also testified that most miners are under the false impression that they will eventually develop black lung disease and that
in his opinion it would be in the best interest of all living miners
if they were given the correct medical information: only a small
percentage are likely to develop coal workers' pneumoconiosis,
and safe dust exposure levels in the working environment are be76
ing achieved in most instances. The United States Department
opof Labor as well as the West Virginia Black Lung Association
7
7
grounds.
same
the
on
provision
posed the entitlement
Given the testimony before Congress and the fact that claimants are not required to show any medical evidence of a respiratory disease, as Turner seems to require, a strong argument can
be made that the twenty-five year presumption does not meet the
74ProposedAmendments to the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act
of 1969: Hearingson S. 1538 Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Human Resources of the United States Senate, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 4
(1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Hearings].
76 Id.

7 H.R. Rpm. No. 95-151, supra note 22, at 589-90.
17 Id. at 590. See also, 1977 Hearings, supra note 74, at 104-05; 125-27; 142-
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rational connection test applied in Mobile and Turner and thus
should be ruled unconstitutional as violative of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution.
B. Is the Twenty-Five Year PresumptionIrrebuttable, and
Thus a Pension?
The basic reason for the enactment of the twenty-five year
presumption was to provide benefits for the elderly widows of
older miners who were unable to gather relevant medical evidence
to support their claim. 78 The medical data required by the Act

prior to the 1977 amendment was either nonexistent or totally
inadequate.7 9 Thus, the provision in the presumption that claimants must furnish to the Secretary evidence with respect to the
health of the miner at the time of his or her death will be superfluous in the majority of the cases. And, if there is no medical
evidence available, the twenty-five year presumption is, in effect,
an irrebuttable presumption.
To .the extent that the twenty-five year presumption irrebuttably entitles a survivor to benefits without a congressional finding of a medical relationship between length of employment and
incidence of pneumoconiosis, the presumption is unreasonable
and arbitrary under the standards set forth in Turner.8 0 In Turner, the Court held that the effect of the irrebuttable presumption contained in section 411(c)(3) was "simply to establish enti78See 1977 Hearings,supra note 74, at 181; S. Rep. No. 95-209, supra note
22, at 18; Senate Debate on S. Bill 1538, 123 CONG. R.c. at § 12516, S12545 (daily
ed. July 21, 1977), reprinted in LEGISLATE HISTORY OP 1977 AmENDMENTS, supra
note 19, at 659. Another important reason was to "get rid of the black lung backlog which plagued HEW and DOL for years." Id. To the extent that the presumption was created to avoid such backlog, administrative convenience cannot override constitutional mandates. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), a case
that involved the constitutionality of an Illinois law which presumed unwed fathers to be unfit to raise children, the Court emphatically stated:
... [t]he Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and
the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect
the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern
for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones. Id. at 656.
79 1977 Hearings supra note 74, at 142. See also S. REP. No. 95-209, supra
note 22, at 18; Senate Debate on S. Bill 1538, supra note 78, at 659.
80 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
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tlement in the case of a miner who is clinically diagnosable as
extremely ill with pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment." 81 The Court added:
[W]ere the Act phrased simply and directly to provide that operators were bound to provide benefits for all miners clinically
demonstrating their affliction with complicated pneumoconiosis arising out of employment in the mines, we think it clear
that there could be no due process objection to it ....

We

cannot say that it would be irrational for Congress to conclude
that impairment of health alone warrants compensation.82
Significantly, on this particular issue the Court emphasized the
fact that Congress was dealing exclusively with complicated pneumoconiosis, the most advanced and progressive stage of the disease.83 It is extremely doubtful that a non-clinically based irrebuttable presumption would meet the constitutional requirements set forth in Turner.
It can be argued that a presumption such as the twenty-five
year presumption, which is not triggered by evidence of a medical
disability and is practicably irrebuttable, is in fact a pension for
the benefit of widows and other dependents. In such case, the
constitutional question is whether Congress has the power to establish such a pension system for widows whose husbands died
before the 1977 Amendments were passed. The Turner decision's
analysis of the pre-1977 presumptions sheds some light on this
issue. In Turner, the coal mine operators relied on RailroadRetirement Board v. Alton Railroad," in support of the proposition
that the Black Lung Act violated the due process clause8 5 by requiring them to compensate employees who terminated their
work in the industry prior to the enactment of the Act and their
survivors. RailroadRetirement Board v. Alton Railroadinvolved
the constitutionality of the federal Railroad Retirement Act of
193488 which, inter alia, established a compulsory retirement and

pension system for railroad employees. The Supreme Court held
that the requirement of pensions for railroad employees was not a
81 Id. at 22.

81 Id. at 23 (emphasis added).

Id.
- 295 U.S. 330 (1935).

83

85 U.S. CONST.
86 Act of June

amend. XIV, § 1.
27, 1934, c. 868 §§ 1-8, 48 Stat. 1283-89 (1934).
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regulation of interstate commerce within the meaning of the Constitution because it had no reasonable relation to the safety and
efficiency of the regulated business. The Court rejected the argument that social and humanitarian considerations demanded the
support of the retired employee on the grounds that such argument failed "to distinguish constitutional power from social desirability."87 To the extent that the pension requirement in question
was based in part on past services, the Court held that "[T]his
clearly arbitrary imposition of liabilities to pay again for services
long since rendered and fully compensated is not permissible legislation.""' The Court also distinguished pension plans from
workers' compensation plans on the grounds that the latter, by
assuring that compensation must be paid for every injury, promotes and encourages safety on the part of the employer.89 In addition, the Court emphasized the fact that workers' compensation
statutes affect existing rights and liabilities under the theory that
the employer should compensate the employee for injuries that
occur during the course of employment. Pensions, to the contrary,
do not attempt to affect any existing obligation or legal liability
but instead seek purely social ends.90 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court found that the federal government was without power to
impose upon the employer the burden of establishing a pension
system for railroad employees.
With regard to the constitutionality of the retroactive aspects
of the 1972 amendments, the Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton
Railroad decision was distinguished by the Supreme Court in
Turner. In answer to the challenge made by the coal mine operators, the Court reasoned:
[t]he point of the black lung benefit provisions is not simply to
increase or supplement a former employee's salary to meet his
generalized need for funds. Rather, the purpose of the Act is to
satisfy a specific need created by the dangerous conditions
under which the former employee labored-to allocate to the
mine operator an actual, measurable cost of his business."1
To the extent that the Black Lung program merely requires

87

295 U.S. at 367.
Id. at 354.

8' Id. at 370.
'o

Id. at 371.

91 Turner, 428 U.S. at 19.
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an employer to compensate his employees for their death or disability due to pneumoconiosis arising out of employment in the
mines, the Court found the Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton
Railroad decision inapposite. Because the Black Lung program,
as it existed in 1972, was analogous in operation to ordinary workers' compensation programs, where a physical injury is a prerequisite for compensation, the Court in Turner could justify the
program as a rational scheme to provide compensation for injuries suffered on the job.
In Turner, however, the Court expressed concern for the fact
that, in the case of employees who terminated their employment
and died before the Act became effective, the irrebuttable presumption of section 411(c)(3) could be viewed as requiring compensation to their survivors for damages resulting from a death
unrelated to the employment. If that were the case, the presumptions would be unconstitutional if applied retroactively. However,
by characterizing the benefits authorized by section 411(c)(3) as
deferred compensation for injury suffered during the miner's lifetime as a result of his illness itself, and not as compensation for
his death, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the presumption.92 Although it was suggested that the payment of benefits to
dependent survivors was irrational as a scheme of compensation
for injury suffered as a result of a miner's disability, the Court
explained that such a scheme was not "wholly unreasonable," because it provided benefits to those who were most likely to have
shared the miner's suffering, which would actually have occurred
in most cases of complicated pneumoconiosis.3
To the extent that the presumption of section 411(c)(5) does
not require a showing of injury, its retroactivity does present a
constitutional problem under the Turner test. Such problem was
noted in Turner in connection with the section 411(c)(3) presumption of death due to pneumoconiosis. The Court specifically
stated that it would face a more difficult problem if the presumption authorized benefits to the survivors of a miner who did not
'die from pneumoconiosis after the enactment of the 1969 Act and
who, during his life, was completely unaware of and unaffected by

92
93

Id.
Id. at 25-26.
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his illness." The same difficulty was also noted in the case of a
miner who, although aware of his pneumoconiosis, died from
other causes before the Act was passed if the presumption were to
authorize benefits for survivors who were completely unaware of
and unaffected by his illness.9 5 However, because the operators
did not make these arguments, the Court declined to "engage in
speculations as to whether such cases may arise." 96
The Court also specifically noted that its analysis of the retrospective application of section 411(c)(3) was "fully applicable to
the retrospective application of any other provision that might be
construed to authorize benefits in the case of miners who die
with, but not from, totally disabling pneumoconiosis. ' '97 Thus, to
the extent that the presumption of section 411(c)(5) provides for
retroactive benefits for the survivors of miners under those circumstances, it can be argued that under the Turner standard this
presumption is unconstitutional. The fact that claimants need no
medical evidence to qualify for the survivor's entitlement does
certainly amount to a pension on a retroactive basis.98
C. Is the Twenty-Five Year Presumption Unconstitutional if
Applied to Previously Denied and Pending Cases?
The presumption requires that the twenty-five years of employment be accrued prior to June 30, 1971, and it is applicable
only to the survivors of miners who died prior to the effective
" Id.
"

98

Id. at 26.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 27, n. 25 (emphasis added).
Interestingly enough the survivors of a miner who died before the 1977 Act

was enacted are entitled to receive more retroactive benefits than any living miner
prior or subsequent to the 1977 Act. No living miner is entitled to benefits on the
sole fact that he worked in the mines for twenty-five years prior to June 30, 1971
(or any other date). Furthermore, no living miner is allowed to receive benefits for
partialdisability. Proof of a totally disabling condition is a prerequisite to eligibil-

ity for benefits for any living miner. See BLA § 411, 30 U.S.C.A. § 921 (West
Supp. 1979). It should also be noted that although the survivor of a miner ma?
recover for partial disability, coal mine operators are required to pay the same
amount of benefits to the survivors of partially and totally disabled miners. If, as
held in Turner,black lung benefits can be characterized as deferred compensation
for injury suffered on the job, the degree of injury suffered should be taken into
account to compute allowable benefits. To require equal benefits for unequal injuries further underlines the arbitrariness of the twenty-five-year presumption.
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date of the 1977 Amendments. Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect that the majority of the claims under this presumption are
those which were filed before the effective date of the 1977
Amendments and which are now being reviewed under the review
provisions of the 1977 Act.9 9 Indeed, the four cases currently
presenting this issue before the Board are claims which are being
reconsidered under those provisions of the 1977 Act. 100 The Department of Labor maintains that all reviewed claims must be
paid by the responsible mine operator, if extant.101 Given such
position, it is pertinent to ask whether the retroactive application
of the twenty-five year presumption to claims filed before the effective date of the Act is constitutionally permissible.
1.

Application of the Review Provisions

Section 15 of the 1977 Act '02 requires the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare to notify all claimants whose
claims under Part B were pending on March 1, 1978, or denied on
or before then. The notice must inform such claimants that, upon
request, their claims will either be reviewed by the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare for a determination under the
1977 Amendments based on the evidence on file or will be referred to the Secretary of Labor for a determination of eligibility
for benefits under the 1977 Amendments, in which event the
claimant is given the opportunity to present additional evidence.

"

Section 15 of the 1977 Act, 30 U.S.C.A. § 945 (West Supp. 1979), discussed

infra.
100 Marinelli v. North American Coal Corp., Case No. 76-BLA-971; Guadiano
v. U.S. Steel Corp., BRB No. 79-114 BLA; Freeman v. Old Ben Coal Co., BRB No.
79-435 BLA; Jackson v. North American Coal Corp., Case No. 80-BLA-210 (Decision dated March 28, 1980). See also, supra, note 47. On March 28, 1980, the
Board ordered the consolidation of these cases with eight other cases involving the
25 year presumption for additional briefing on the issue of Trust Fund liability for
benefits to survivors of miners who completed the 25 years or more of coal mine
employment prior to January 1, 1970, and July 1, 1971, but continued to work in
the mines thereafter. The other cases are: Battaglia v. Peabody Coal Co., BRB No.
79-633 BLA; Bishop v. Peabody Coal Co., BRB No. 79-635 BLA; Chrislip v. Bethlehem Mine Corp., BRB No. 79-733 BLA; McKemore v. Amax Coal Co., BRB No.
79-714 BLA; Soulsby v. Consolidation Coal Co., BRB No. 79-686 BLA; Stivers v.
Peabody Coal Co., BRB No. 70-739 BLA; Trugillo v. Kaiser Steel Corp., BRB No.
78-398 BLA; Turchi v. Amax Coal Co., BRB No. 79-758 BLA.
10120 C.F.R. §§ 727.303-.304 (1979).
10"30 U.S.C.A. § 945 (West Supp. 1979).
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If, upon review, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
determines that the claimant is eligible under Part B, the approval is certified to the Secretary of Labor to "make or otherwise
provide for the payment of the claim.

103

However, if the Secre-

tary of Health, Education and Welfare does not approve
claim, he must refer it to the Secretary of Labor for a second
termination under Part C standards. For Part C purposes,
date of the request for review by the claimant is considered as
date of the filing of the claim. 1

the
dethe
the

Under section 15 of the 1977 Act, the Secretary of Labor is
also required to review each claim denied on or before March 1,
1978, under Part C or under section 415,105 and all claims pending

on that date, taking into account the 1977 Amendments. Since
the review is automatic, the Secretary need not notify the claimant that he will be entitled to it. If approved, the Secretary makes
or otherwise provides for the payment of the claim. Individuals
whose claims are reviewed and approved by either the Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare or the Secretary of Labor are
entitled to retroactive benefits for a period beginning no earlier
than January 1, 1974.0 6 Payments for reviewed claims will be
made either from the Trust Fund or by the identifiable coal operator.107 Under the regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor,
"denied" and pending claims as used in the 1977 Act include
108
claims denied by or pending before a federal court of appeals.
2. Legislative History of the Review Provisions of the 1977
Act
House Bill 4544 contained a provision requiring the Secretaries of Health, Education and Welfare and Labor to review all denied or pending claims under Parts B and C, respectively, to determine whether there had been any initial error or inappropriate
denial and to adjudicate them under the 1977 Amendments.10 9 If
approved, they were to be paid by the Department of Health, Ed203 Id. at
10'Id. at
105Id. at
'
101
108

§ 945(a)(2)(A).
§ 945(a)(4).

§ 925.
BLA § 435, 30 U.S.C.A. § 945(c) (West Supp. 1979).

See 30 U.S.C.A. § 934 (West Supp. 1979); 20 C.F.R. § 727.304 (1979).

20 C.F.R. § 727.102(b), (c) (1979). See also 20 C.F.R. § 727.404 (1979).
No. 95-151, supra note 22, at 25.

109 H.R. REP.
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ucation and Welfare, in the case of Part B claims, or by the Department of Labor under Part C.110 The House bill did not provide for retroactive awards in claims approved upon review. The
Senate bill contained a provision which allowed individuals whose
Part B and C claims had been denied to reffie under Part C for a
consideration of their claims under the new medical criteria established by the 1977 Act."" The Secretary of Labor was required
to notify all individuals whose claims were denied under Part B
and Part C of their right to refile. Retroactive benefits allowed
under the review provisions were to be paid as follows: Part B
claims denied by the Social Security Administration were to be
paid retroactively to January 1, 1974; section 415 and Part C denied claims were to be paid retroactively to January 1, 1974, or
the date the original claim was filed, whichever was later."'
The Conference Report basically adopted the House Bill provisions pertaining to review of all denied or pending Part B and
Part C claims taking into account the changes made by the
amendments.113 It established a notification system for the review
of Part B claims'" and automatic review for Part C claims. 1 5 The
Conference Report specifically states that for "purposes of payment of benefits all claims under review shall be treated as Part C
provisions which require payment of benefits by a coal mine operator, other employer, or by the Trust Fund established by the
Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977."1'1

The Conference

substitute adopted the Senate amendment which precluded any
retroactivity of benefits for a period prior to January 1, 1974.117
110

Id.

"I S. R .No. 95-209, supra note 22, at 15-16, 32, 52.

112Id.

11 H.R. REP.No. 95-864, supra note 41.
114 Most Part B claims covered by the 1977 Act had already been reviewed
once under the provisions of the 1972 Amendments which required the Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare to review all pending and denied Part B claims
under the 1972 standards. See § 431 of the 1969 Act, as amended by the 1972 Act.
11 The number of claims to be reviewed by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and the Secretary of Labor under the 1977 provisions was estimated as 200,000. Senate Debate on H.R. 4544, 124 CONG. REc. S1443, S1444
(daily ed. February 7, 1978), reprinted in LEGISLATivE HISTORY OF 1977 AMENDMENTs, supra note 19, at 901.
I H.R. REP. No. 95-864, supra note 41, at 22.

11There is no significant debate or other congressional materials on this issue at either the time when the House bill was passed or when the Conference
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UnconstitutionalRetroactivity

An analysis of the retroactivity of the 1977 Amendments
must begin with the Turner opinion's 1 8 discussion concerning
similar provisions in the 1972 Amendments. Specifically, the issue
in Turner was whether the 1972 Amendments violated the due
process clause of the fifth amendment by requiring mine operators to compensate former employees who had terminated their
work in the industry before the 1969 Act was passed. Although
the Court declared them to be constitutional, it emphasized the
fact that, although the 1972 Act had some retroactive effect, it
did not impose any liabilities on operators until 1974, two years
after its enactment. 119 Thus because the application of the 1972
Amendments would be limited to claims subsequently filed, such
legislation was permissible. In addition, even though the new law
was not expected by employers, the Court stated that prior cases
were clear in holding that "legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations." 120 To the extent that the 1972 Amendments imposed
liabilities for the effects of disabilities bred in the past, the Court
found that the its provisions were justified as "a rational measure
to spread the costs of the employees' disabilities to those who
have profited from the fruits of their labor - the operators and
the coal consumers."1 21 This statement, however, was qualified by
the repeated assertion by the Court that "a substantial portion of
the burden for disabilities stemming from the period prior to the
1 22
enactment is borne by the Federal Government.
To the extent that the Court based its decision upon the fact
that the employer's liabilities were limited to a specific period of
time (i.e., to a period beginning January 1, 1974) and that the
government had rationally and equally split the cost of the benefits between the federal government and private industry, Turner
does support the proposition that, in order to satisfy due process
requirements, liability for claims filed prior to June 30, 1973, cannot be imposed upon coal mine operators by reason of the 1978

Report was adopted.

I18 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
11 Id. at 16.
120 Id.

121Id. at 18.
122 Id.
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Amendments. Thus, any Part B claims which are reviewed now

should be paid out of the Black Lung Trust Fund. 123 At the very
least, Turner should stand for the proposition that any liabilities
imposed upon coal operators by the 1977 Act can only begin after
the effective date of the 1977 Amendments.
The conclusions suggested by the Turner opinion are sup123 See 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 934, 934(a)(West Supp. 1979). In Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935), a case involving amendments to the
bankruptcy law which operated to take substantive rights of the mortgagee for the
benefit of the mortgagor, the United States Supreme Court stated:
[T]he Fifth Amendment commands that, however great the Nation's need, private property shall not be thus taken even for a wholly
public use without just compensation. If the public interest requires,
and permits, the taking of property of individual mortgagees in order to
relieve the necessities of individual mortgagors, resort must be had to
proceedings by eminent demain; so that, through taxation, the burden
of the relief afforded in the public interest may be borne by the public.
At 602 (emphasis added).
To the extent that the 1977 Amendments were enacted to facilitate eligibility
for benefits, they can be fairly characterized as enacted to "relieve the necessities"
of individual claimants who prior to the 1977 Amendments were unable to qualify
for benefits. Under the Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank test such relief should
be provided through the Trust Fund, which is funded by a tax imposed upon the
coal mine operators. See Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.A. §§
934-934(a)(West Supp. 1979).
Further, under the 1977 review provisions, the Secretary of Labor is required
to treat claims referred by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare as if
they were Part C claims. BLA § 435(a)(3)(A), 30 U.S.C.A. § 945(b)(1)(West Supp.
1979). Under the regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor under the 1977 Act,
mine operators are held responsible for benefits allowed in reviewed Part B
claims. 20 C.F.R. § 727.304(1979). Thus, although all Part B claims approved prior
to the 1977 Act are now being paid out of the Trust Fund, coal mine operators are
required to pay benefits for reviewed Part B claims. This unequal treatment of
equally situated claims appears to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution, which is applicable to the federal government through
the Due Process Clause. Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68 (1887).
The propriety and constitutionality of imposing liability upon operators for
Part B claims where the miner last worked in a coal mine prior to July 1, 1973,
and his survivors elected to have the claims reviewed by the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare have been raised by coal mine operators in Bordas v. Republic Steel Corp., BRB No. 79-753 BLA; Mrosko v. U.S. Steel Corp., BRB No.
79-776 BLA; Paulion v. Consolidation Coal Co., BRB No. 79-687 BLA; Ruston v.
Allegheny River Mining Co., BRB No. 79-684 BLA; Sakatini v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
BRB No. 79-777 BLA; Ward v. U.S. Steel Corp., BRB No. 79-778 BLA; and
Yakubco v. Republic Steel Corp., BRB No. 79-674 BLA.
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ported by a long line of United States Supreme Court cases that
have addressed the retroactive imposition of new liabilities similar to those imposed by the Black Lung Act. For example, in New
York CentralRailroad v. White,124 a case involving the constitutionality of a New York workers' compensation statute which
abolished certain employer common law defenses, the Court upheld its constitutionality, inter alia, on the grounds that it had
"no retrospective effect, and applied only to cases arising some
months after its passage." In another decision handed down on
the same day, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a state's
workers' compensation statute which in like fashion substantially
altered the rights and duties between employees and employers
on the grounds that, although the Act was approved on March 14,
1911, it was not to take effect until October 1 of that year, with
actions pending and causes of action existing through September
30 being expressly saved. "It therefore disturbed no vested rights,
its effect being confined to regulating the relations of employer
and employee in the hazardous occupations in futuro."1 25
Similarly, in cases involving the review of final orders after
the period for review of the award had expired, the United States
Supreme Court has held that retroactive legislation may not impose liabilities where none existed before. In ParaminoLumber
Co. v. Marshall,26 a private Act of Congress which authorized
and directed the review of a Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act claim after an award for disability thereunder
had become final was held not violative of the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment because it did not create a new liability.
The defendant commissioner in ParaminoLumber Co. had determined on August 26, 1931, that a claim by plaintiff's employee
was allowable for the period January 17, 1931, to August 26, 1931.
The order became final 30 days thereafter, when the period for
review expired. Almost five years later, Congress passed a private
act ordering the Compensation Commission to review the case
and to issue a new order. Additional medical facts, discovered after payments under the Act had ended, would have entitled the
claimant to benefits for an extended period if they had been
124 243 U.S. 188, 202 (1917).

Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 236 (1917). See also
Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100 (1947).
122

126309 U.S. 370 (1940).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol82/iss4/42

32

Millstone and Codnach: The Survivors' 25-Year Presumption under the Black Lung Benefits
1980]

SURVIVORS' PRESUMPTION

1111

known at the time the original claim was filed. The Commissioner, however, had no jurisdiction under the Act to readjust his
claim after the discovery. On those facts, the Court held that the
immunity obtained by the lapse of time was not the type which
protects its beneficiary from retroactive legislation authorizing review of the claim:
This private act does not set aside a judgment, create a new
right of action or direct the entry of an award.... It does not
operate to create new obligations where none existed before. It
is an act to cure a defect in administration developed in the
handling of a compensable claim. If the continuing injury had
been known during the period of compensation, payments of
the same amount due under the award authorized by this act
would have been due to the employee. In such circumstances
we see no violation of the due process clause.121
The principle underlying the conclusion reached in Paramino
Lumber Co. is well illustrated by a series of cases involving curative statutes which, unlike the twenty-five year presumption, seek
to remedy administrative defects or mistakes. In United States v.
Heinszen & Co.,12 the United States had imposed a system of
tariff duties on goods coming into the Philippine Islands after
they came under the military control of the United States on July
12, 1898. The tariffs were in force when the Treaty of Peace was
signed on December 10, 1898, and when the Treaty was ratified
on April 11, 1899. They were continued by the Phillippine Commission in April, 1900. In 1902, the tariffs were expressly approved and continued by an Act of Congress. Between 1901 and
127 Id. at 378. See also New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Cardillo, 108 F.2d 492
(D.C. Cir. 1939) (a case involving an amendment to the Longshoremen's Compen-

sation Act), where an employee who had been granted compensation for temporary partial disability between March 2, 1932, and August 9, 1937, filed for a modification of the award in September, 1937, to provide for compensation for
permanent partial disability pursuant to the provisions of a 1934 amendment authorizing the reopening of cases at any time prior to one year after the date of the
last payment of compensation. The carrier opposed this claim on the ground that
the 1934 amendment could not be applied to injuries sustained and awards made

prior to the amendment. The court rejected this argument on the ground that the
amendment "neither creates new, nor destroys old rights. It applies only to the
remedy ... [and] Congress had the power to extend or to contract the period of
limitation as applicable to an indemnity claim either pending or subsequently
brought." At 493 (emphasis added).
11 206 U.S. 370 (1907).
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1906, several United States Supreme Court decisions had held
that the duties paid after the ratification of the Treaty but before
the 1902 Congressional Act were illegal. The suit at issue, involving payment of the illegal tariffs, had been brought after the first
1901 decision but before the 1902 Congressional Act and it was
pending in 1906 when the last United States Supreme Court decision was rendered in the other related cases. On June 20, 1906,
after the last decision, Congress passed an act for the purpose of
ratifying the collection of duties previously declared illegal by the
United States Supreme Court.
The Court held that because the illegality of the tariff was
not the result of an inherent want of power by the United States
but simply arose from a failure to delegate the official authority
to validate the tariffs, it was proper for the Congress to ratify acts
of his agents. The Court added that the mere fact that the suit
was pending when the act was enacted did not change the nature
of the right.
If the legislature, however, does not have the power to create
a duty at the time when the suit was filed, the retroactive features
of a statute would not satisfy the due process clause. In Forbes
Pioneer Board Line v. Board of Commissioners,2 ' the plaintiff
had brought suit in 1917 to recover tolls unlawfully collected for
passage through the lock of a canal. In 1919, on the day of a decision in favor of plaintiff by the Florida Supreme Court, the Legislature passed an act purporting to validate the collection. The
new act was pleaded by the defendant and the Florida Supreme
Court rendered judgment for the defendant. The United States
Supreme Court reversed, stating:
The argument that prevailed below was based on the supposed
analogy of United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U.S. 370,
(Rafferty v. Smith, Bell & Co., 257 U.S. 226,) which held that
Congress could ratify the collection of a tax that had been
made without authority of law. That analogy, however, fails. A
tax may be imposed in respect of past benefits, so that if instead of calling it a ratification Congress had purported to impose the tax for the first time the enactment would have been
within its power. Wagner v. Baltimore, 239 U.S. 207, 216, 217.
Stockdale v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 20 Wall. 323. But gener-

129

258 U.S. 338 (1922).
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ally ratification of an act is not good if attempted at a time
when the ratifying authority could not lawfully do the act.
Bird v. Brown, 4 Exch. 786, 799. If we apply that principle this
statute is invalid. For if the Legislature of Florida had attempted to make the plaintiff pay in 1919 for passages through
the lock of a canal, that took place before 1917, without any
promise of reward, there is nothing in the case as it stands to
indicate that it could have done so any more effectively than it
made a man pay a baker for a gratuitous deposit of
could have
10
rolls. 3
In reaching this decision, the Court emphasized that the expectations of the parties is one of the relevant factors to consider
in order to determine the constitutionality of a retroactive
statute:
Defendant owed the plaintiff a definite sum of money that it
had extorted from the plaintiff without right. It is hard to find
any ground for saying that the promise of the law that the
public force shall be at the plaintiff's disposal is less absolute
than it is when the claim is for goods sold. Yet no one would
say that a claim for goods sold could be abolished without
compensation. It would seem from the first decision of the
Court below that the transaction was not one for which payment naturally could have been expected. To say that the Legislature simply was establishing the situation as both parties
knew from the beginning it ought to be would be putting
something of a gloss upon the facts. We must assume that the
plaintiff went through the canal relying upon its legal rights.
and it is not to be deprived of them because the Legislature
31
forgot.1
Although prior to 1977 Congress may have had the power to
impose upon coal mine operators the same liabilities it has imposed in 1977, the fact remains that it did not exercise its power
until 1977. In addition, the 1977 Amendments do not operate to
ratify prior actions or to correct administrative mistakes, they
simply impose new liabilities. Thus, under the authorities dis-

cussed above, the retroactive application of the 1977 Amendments as applied
13 2
unconstitutional.

to

coal

mine

operators

is

patently

130 Id. at 339.
1Si Id. at 340.
132 The difference between administrative mistakes and new rights was fur-
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CONCLUSION

The 1977 Amendments to the Black Lung Act impose new
standards and liabilities on coal mine operators. The twenty-five
year presumption is the most onerous of these new liabilities and
the most difficult "rebuttable" presumption for an operator to
overcome. The lack of any rational connection between the fact
presumed (total disability or death due to pneumoconiosis) and
the fact proven (length of employment), the effective operation of
the presumption as a pension for survivors of coal miners, and the
retrospective application of the provision all present serious constitutional issues which should not be ignored by coal mine operators in the defense of black lung claims.

ther explained in Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409 (1931), a case involving a retroactive Act of Congress which barred recovery by taxpayers of payment
for taxes properly owing but collection of which was barred by limitation. The
taxpayer had paid its taxes under protest when the Internal Revenue Service,
under a mistaken view of the law, insisted on collecting them after the time for its
collection had expired. After the taxpayer had brought suit to enforce its right to
recover the taxes, Congress enacted the Act barring recovery. The United States
Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality on the ground that the purpose of the
statute was to correct administrative mistakes. The Court stated:
This is not a case of an attempt [to] retroactively create a liability
in relation to a transaction as to which no liability had previously attached. There is no question here as to the originalliability of the taxpayers. The tax was a valid one [when imposed]. . . . At 426 (emphasis
added).
It is apparent, as the result of the decisions, that a distinction is made
between a bare attempt of the legislature retroactivelyto create liabilities for transactionswhich, fully consummated in the past, are deemed
to leave no ground for legislative intervention, and the case of a curative statute aptly designed to remedy mistakes and defects in the administrationof government where the remedy can be applied without
injustice. Where the asserted vested right, not being linked to any substantial equity, arises from the mistake of officers purporting to administer the law in the name of the Government, the legislature is not prevented from curing the defect in administration simply because the
effect may be to destroy causes of action which would otherwise exist. At
429 (emphasis added).
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